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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING PRETRIAL
IDENTIFICATION PROCEEDINGS-
AN EXAMINATION*
In United States v. Wade,1 and companion cases,2 the Supreme
Court of the United States focused constitutional attention on pre-
trial identification procedures, and, after a comprehensive examina-
tion of the area decided that pretrial identification procedures were
a critical stage in the proceedings against an accused and that
thereby the sixth amendment right to counsel applied to the states
as incorporated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Thus, the court indicated that pretrial identification proceed-
ings, conducted after June 12, 1967,3 will receive judicial scrutiny
before any such pretrial identification evidence is admissable in
court.
The purpose of this comment is twofold. First, it seeks to clarify
the present state of the law involving pretrial identification proceed-
ings in light of the impact of these decisions by discussing what
counsel may and may not do when representing a client who is to
be subjected to a pretrial identification proceeding. Second, it urges
the adoption of reforms vitally necessary for the welfare of the
state, its law enforcement officials, and the bar.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
It will be helpful at this point to briefly discuss the constitu-
tional evolution of the right to counsel clause of the sixth amend-
ment.
The first landmark decision was decided in 1932 when in Powell
v. Alabama,4 the court held:
All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in
a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty
of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel to him as
a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not
discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such cir-
cumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the prep-
aration and trial of the case.5
* This article was completed prior to the passage of Ttile H of the
"Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968" which attempts
to legislatively reverse the Supreme Court's recent decisions concern-
ing admissibility of confessions and eye witness testimony.
1 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
2 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967).
3 The Wade and Gilbert decisions were made non-retroactive in Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
4 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5 287 U.S. at 71 (1932) (emphasis added).
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After Powell, the court held in Johnson v. Zerbst6 that the sixth
amendment requires the furnishing of counsel by the federal gov-
ernment to federal indigent defendants. This progressive trend
was reversed when Betts v. Brady7 held that the sixth amendment
applied only to trials in the federal courts and that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment did not incorporate the spe-
cific guarantees of the sixth amendment albeit a denial of a combi-
nation of rights may deprive a litigant of due process.
The indication that Betts rested on unsound grounds was made
apparent when Hamilton v. Alabama (holding that arraignment in
a capital case is a critical stage in the proceedings against an ac-
cused) marked the beginning of the sixties, a revolutionary decade
in criminal law history.
First the court overruled Betts v. Brady9 in Gideon v. Wain-
wright.0 In Gideon the court held that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment incorporates the sixth amendment thus
making the sixth amendment obligatory on the states.
Next, the court decided Douglas v. California," which held that
defendants were denied equal protection of the law where they were
denied benefit of counsel in their mandatory appeal from a trial
court verdict.
Finally to remove all doubt as to their intention, the Court in
White v. Maryland12 unanimously reaffirmed Hamilton, holding that
arraignment is a critical stage in a capital case and therefore defense
counsel must be present.
The court next turned to its supervisory powers over the
federal courts and held in Massiah v. United States3 that defend-
ant's fifth and sixth amendment rights were violated. The court
in quoting Powell said:
This view no more than reflects a constitutional principle estab-
lished as long ago as Powell v. Alabama (citation omitted) where
the court noted that '.. .during perhaps the most critical period of
the proceedings ... that is to say from the time of arraignment until
the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough going
investigation and preparation (are) vitally important, the defend-
ants... (are) as much entitled to such aid (of counsel) during that
period as at the trial itself." 4
6 304U.S. 458 (1938).
7 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
8 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
9 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
10 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
12 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
'3 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
'14 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964).
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Massiah was a federal case and the sixth amendment "directly
applied."'15 Twenty-two days later the court decided Escobedo v.
Illinois,' which held that where an investigation is no longer gen-
eral in nature but is focused upon a particular suspect and police
have not effectively warned him of his constitutional rights the
accused has been denied his right of assistance of counsel and no
statement elicited by police during such illegal interrogations could
be used against him. Thus, the sixth amendment applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment and pretrial interroga-
tion was a critical stage in the proceedings against an accused.
The court further clarified its stand in Miranda v. Arizona17
where it held that if a person in custody was to be interrogated at
all he must be informed in "clear and unequivocal terms"'8 of his
constitutional rights including his right to have a lawyer appointed
to represent him. The court also pointed out that the accused will
be presumed not to have waived his rights. However, seven days
after Miranda was decided the court drew a line when in Schmerber
v. California9 they held that evidence of petitioner's blood taken
over the objection of Schmerber and his counsel did not violate his
fourth, fifth, or sixth amendment rights.2 0
Finally, the court continued its trend when in In re Gault2' the
court held that the fourteenth amendment due process clause ap-
plies to delinquency adjudication which could result in a youth's
confinement.
It is in this historical light that we now turn to a discussion of
right to counsel at pretrial identification proceedings.
II. WHERE ARE WE NOW
A. THE_.DEcIsIONs
Vital at this point is an in-depth analysis of what exactly is
the scope of the Wade, Gilbert v. California and Stovall v. Denno
holdings.
15 Id. at 205.
16 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
17 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
19 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
20 The Court construed the right to counsel claim to be a limited one and
indicated that petitioner's claim was devoid of any issue of counsel's
ability to have assisted petitioner in respect to any of the rights he did
possess.
21 387 U.S.1 (1967).
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(1) United States v. Wade
Billy Joe Wade allegedly robbed a federally insured bank in
Eustace, Texas on September 21, 1964. The robber wore a small
strip of tape on each side of his face and, so attired, pointed a pistol
at the female cashier, handed her a pillow case and said something
like, "put the money in the bag." .Following an indictment on March
23, 1965, Wade was arrested on April 2. Counsel was appointed to
represent him on April 26.
Fifteen days after counsel had been appointed to represent him,
an FBI agent, without giving notice to Wade's lawyer, arranged to
have two bank employees observe a lineup made up of Wade and
five or six other prisoners conducted in a courtroom of the
local county courthouse. Each member of the lineup wore strips
of tape and repeated the words "put the money in the bag." Wade
was identified as the bank robber by both of the bank employees.
Faced with a constitutional attack of Wade's conviction on both
fifth and sixth amendment grounds the court first held: "Neither
the lineup itself nor anything shown by this record that Wade was
required to do in the lineup violated his privilege against self-
incrimination."22 However, the court went on to say that although
none of petitioner's fifth amendment rights were violated, that in
this case, contrary to Schmerber2 3 counsel was "indispensable to
protect Wade's most basic right as a criminal defendant-his right
to a fair trial at which the witnesses against him might be meaning-
fully cross-examined."24
Thus, the constitutional gravamen of the pretrial identification
is not the participation in the identification by the suspect, but
rather the conducting by the police of any pretrial identification in
absence of a lawyer to insure that the suspects constitutional rights
have been respected.
With this constitutional question in mind the court turned to
procedure. It said that "a per se exclusionary rule would be unjusti-
fied,"25 but by the same token felt that a rule which solely excluded
testimony concerning identification at the lineup itself, without
regard to the in-court identification which was sure to follow, would
be an empty rule at best. Therefore, the majority decided that
22 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967).
23 " "Our rejection of the right to counsel claim in Schmerber rested on
our conclusion in that case that '[n]o issue of counsel's ability to assist
petitioner in respect of any rights he did possess is presented."' " Id. at
223 (citations omitted).
24 388 U.S. 218, 223-24 (1967) (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 240.
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the test as set out in Wong Sun v. United States26 would be the
proper test to use. That test is as follows:
"Whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distin-
guishable to be purged of the primary taint."27
The court indicates that in application of this test several factors
must be considered which are as follows: (1) what prior opportunity
did the eye witness have to observe the alleged criminal act;
(2) whether there was any discrepancy between any pre-lineup
description and the defendant's actual in-court description; (3) any
identification prior to the lineup of someone other than the defend-
ant; (4) the identification by the use of pictures of the defendant
prior to the lineup; (5) failure to identify the defendant on a prior
occasion; and (6) the lapse of time between the alleged act and the
lineup identification. 28
The court also indicates that a very relevant question in any
determination of the admissibility of an identification made in court,
will be whether such in-court identification was based upon an
illegal pretrial identification or on the contrary whether it was of
independent origin.
The court briefly mentioned the concept of waiver and indicated
that the state will have the obligation of proving that the defendant
did in fact waive his right to counsel. With the Miranda case on
the books this should be a hard burden for the state to overcome.
However, the majority specifically pointed out the possibility of the
application of the harmless error doctrine.29
Thus, after June 12, 1967,30 any post-indictment pretrial identi-
fication of a suspect conducted in the absence of his counsel and
absent an intelligent waiver of that right, will result in a hearing
to determine whether the courtroom identification is of independent
origin or the direct result of a prior illegal pretrial identification.
26 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
27 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967), citing Wong Sun v.
United States, 371, U.S. 471, 488 (1963), which cited MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE
oF GUILT, 221 (1959).
28 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967).
29 "We therefore think the appropriate procedure to be followed is to
vacate the conviction pending a hearing to determine whether the in-
court identifications had an independent source, or whether, in any
event, the introduction of the evidence was harmless error, Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18." 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1946).80 "We hold that Wade and Gilbert affect only those cases and all future
cases which involve confrontations for identification purposes conduct-
ed in absence of counsel after this date." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
296 (1967).
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(2) Gilbert v. California
Jesse James Gilbert was convicted in California of the armed
robbery of the Mutual Savings and Loan Association of Alhambra
and the murder of a police officer during the course of the robbery.
During the course of the robberies a handwritten note was used.
During pretrial interrogation petitioner requested counsel and re-
fused to answer any questions without counsel's advice. He later
did answer some questions and at that time gave handwriting
examples, which were later used against him in court. Hours after
the robbery, police had broken into Gilbert's apartment and acquired
some photographs of him which were immediately shown to the
witnesses. Sixteen days after he had been indicted and appointed
counsel he was identified at a lineup which was conducted without
any notice having been given to his counsel.
The court applied the Wade rule and held that it was constitu-
tional error to admit the in-court identifications without first deter-
mining whether or not they were of independent origin and not
tainted by the illegal lineup.
However, concerning the fact that nine witnesses testified on
the stand that they identified Gilbert at a pretrial showup, the
court held that such testimony was a direct result of the illegals '
pretrial lineup, "come at by exploitation of (the primary) ille-
gality.382 The court held:
The State is therefore not entitled to an opportunity to show that
that testimony had an independent source. Only a per se exclu-
sionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to
assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's
constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical
lineup.33
Therefore, adding the Gilbert holding to the Wade holding we
conclude that any post-indictment identification proceeding con-
ducted against an accused who is not represented by counsel and
who has not intelligently waived that right results in a hearing to
determine whether any subsequent in-court identification would
have an origin separate and apart from the pretrial confrontation.
In addition, if a pretrial lineup is conducted in absence of counsel
then no witness will be allowed to testify in court as to results of
said illegal lineup.
31 Illegal in the sense that counsel was not present.
32 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967), citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
488 (1963).
33 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967).
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(3) Stovall v. Denno
Petitioner allegedly stabbed a doctor, inflicting a fatal wound,
and also stabbed the doctor's wife eleven times in the kitchen of
the doctor's Long Island home. While the doctor's wife lay in cri-
tical condition in the hospital, five policemen and two members of
the district attorney's staff brought a Negro suspect to her hospital
room for identification purposes. One officer finally asked her if
he was the man and she then so identified him from her hospital bed.
Petitioner was not given any time to obtain counsel before he under-
went the hospital identification. At the petitioner's trial, the wife
made an in-court identification, and both she and the officers testi-
fied as to her hospital room identification. Petitioner was convicted
and sentenced to death.
The court held that the Wade ruling was not to be applied
retroactively. However, Stovall goes much further than the retro-
activity issue.
The court articulates an avenue of attack even though Wade
and Gilbert are not retroactive; that attack was that the confronta-
tion resulted in such a degree of unfairness that it infringed defend-
ant's right to due process of law. The court phrased the issue as
follows:
[W]hether petitioner, although not entitled to the application of
Wade and Gilbert to his case, is entitled to relief on his claim that
in any event the confrontation conducted in this case was so
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to inexorable mistaken iden-
tification that he was denied due process of law.3 4
The court recognized this attack as separate and apart from a right
to counsel claim. They held that the proper test for determining
whether due process has been violated "... depends on the totality
of the circumstances surrounding it." 35 When analyzing the facts of
Stovall and comparing the tests used with the holding it is urged
that one can easily come to a misunderstood conclusion. Even
though the facts indicate that the showup Stovall was forced to
undergo was one of the most suggestive procedures possible,36 the
34 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
35 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); See Simmons v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 967
(1968); Biggers v. State of Tennessee, 88 S. Ct. 979 (1968); Crume v.
Beto, 383 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1967); State v. Nelson, 223 Ga. 497, 156
S.E.2d 341 (1967) and State v. Sears, 182 Neb. 384, 155 N.W.2d 332
(1967), for an application of this test.
36 "The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of
identification has been widely condemned." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 302 (1967). Not only was Stovall shown singly to the doctor's wife
but he was also handcuffed and was the only Negro in the room.
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fairness alone was not the sole question when determining whether
due process requirements had been met. Here the court attached
great weight to the fact that the doctor's wife was in danger of
dying. Applying the totality of circumstances test it concluded that
the fact that death was imminent was a controlling circumstance.
Other than this the court has set out virtually no guidelines as to
what is a violation of due process and there is strong indication
that this area will be handled on a case to case basis.
B. THE PosT-PRE INicwzmArT QUESTION
As before mentioned, the court goes to great pains to point
out the potential for prejudice in an eye witness identification, thus
necessitating counsel's presence at this critical stage. However, by
holding Wade and Gilbert to their facts the court avoids the ques-
tion of whether only post-indictment eye witness identification con-
frontations are protected by a right to counsel. It seems hard to
believe that there could be any real difference in the potential for
prejudice in a post-indictment and a pre-indictment confrontation
yet with Wade and Gilbert as precedent this is exactly the situation
today. Therefore, if a suspect is placed in a lineup at any time prior
to indictment, counsel's presence is not a constitutional requisite.30 7
At this writing, at least two state appellate courts have indicated
that when they can no longer apply the non-retroactivity of the
Stovall holding they might distinguish Wade and Gilbert in this
manner.3 8 Exactly why the court so restricted Wade and Gilbert is
not clear. Certainly, the court wants to give the state law enforce-
ment agencies notice that there is a necessity for reform in this area
and that certain minimum standards must be complied with. The
best guess seems to be that the court will handle this area on a
case by case method, which will give the police time to adjust their
procedure. However, it still is hard to escape the logic that if lineups
are indeed so fraught with potential prejudice that this stage is
critical thus making counsel's presence mandatory, then whether a
suspect has been indicted or not should not be important.
37 At least not by a literal reading of the opinion.
38 See State v. Matlock, 49 N.J. 491, 231 A.2d 369, 373, n.1 (1967) and State
v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 231 A.2d 565, 575 n. 1 (1967), 'Defendant was
not represented by counsel when the three witnesses saw him for pre-
trial identifications. The United States Supreme Court has just held
that a post-indictment viewing of the accused by a witness arranged
by the police to determine identification is a critical stage at which
the accused has a sixth amendment right to be represented by
counsel. (citations omitted). In the present case the prior identifica-
tions occurred before and not after the indictment . . . ." See also
People v. Crosslin, - Cal. 2.d , P.2d - , 60 Cal. Rptr. 309,
318 (1967). "[T]he case at bench is distinguishable from Wade and
Gilbert in that the lineup identification occurred prior to the appoint-
ment of counsel to represent him .... "
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The likely motive of the court for so restricting Wade and Gil-
bert is simply that they didn't want to go too far, too fast. If this
was their goal it seems to be quite effective. On the one hand the
Court has made their position clear to the federal and state courts.
On the other hand the decisions are restrictive enough that guilty
men will not go free due to a change in the law.
Accepting the case by case approach, and with no knowledge
as to the scope of any clarification decision, it becomes important
at this stage to analyze what counsel may and may not do in the
pretrial eye witness identification area, as a result of this decision.
C. FUNCTION OF COUNSEL
The Wade, Gilbert and Stovall decisions leave many questions
unanswered. Perhaps one of the most important issues the decisions
avoid is the problem of what function to the system and to the
client can counsel fulfill. May he act as an active adversary in the
police station itself? Or is his sole function that of a witness to the
proceedings?
At this point a brief description of the various kinds of pretrial
confrontations is in order. In the main, there seem to be two dis-
tinct kinds of confrontations. The first type is known as the show-up
and is defined as follows:
[A] mode of identification other than an identification parade is a
show-up, the presentation of a single suspect to a witness for pur-
poses of identification. Together with its aggravated forms, it
constitutes the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now
or ever used by the police.39
Show-ups then are any exposure of the suspect to the witness on
a one-to-one basis, either "accidently" or otherwise.
Wall defines a lineup as follows:
First, in order to distinguish it from a show-up, the lineup was
defined above to mean any procedure where more than one person
is presented to the witness for purposes of identification. As will be
pointed out later, however, the number of persons in the lineup
obviously has an important bearing upon its fairness, and the smaller
the number of participants, the more will the lineup resemble a
show-up, and partake of all its weaknesses.40
The first function the attorney's presence at the pretrial identi-
fication fulfils is that of a witness. In the words of the Wade court:
39 P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN C 1vIINAL CASES 27 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Wall].
40 Id. at 41.
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But as is the case with secret interrogations, there is serious diffi-
culty in depicting what transpires at lineups and other forms of
identification confrontations. 'Privacy results in secrecy and this in
turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact went on...
Miranda v. Arizona, supra, (citation omitted). For the same reasons,
the defense can seldom reconstruct the manner and mode of lineup
identification for judge and jury at trial.... In any event, neither
witnesses nor lineup participants are apt to be alert for conditions
prejudicial to the suspect, and if they were, it would likely be of
scant benefit to the suspect since neither witnesses nor lineup
participants are likely to be schooled in the detection of suggestive
influences.41
This raises the issue of what is suggestive and could be a con-
tributing factor in inducing a witness into making a faulty identifi-
cation 42
The first thing the attorney should do when faced with an im-
pending lineup is to determine who the witness is and exactly what
is the witness's relationship to the suspect. Ordinarily it will be
criminal-victim, however, other relationships might exist which
would cast doubt upon the objectivity of any subsequent identifica-
tion.43 Counsel should then concern himself with the particular
physical surroundings in which the suspect was identified. If the
suspect was allegedly observed in the rain or in the evening, ob-
viously a brightly lit stage would not be the best setting for a lineup,
and might lead to mistaken identity.44
The next step would be for the attorney to ascertain what was
the verbal description (if any) given to the police when they first
learned of the crime.45
41 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1967).
42 See generally Murray, The Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad,
1966 UTAH L. REV. 610; Wall, supra note 39. Napley, Problems of Af-
fecting the Presentation of the Case for a Defendant, 66 COL. L. RPv.
94 (1966); Williams, Identification Parades, 1955 Cmv. L. REV. 525; Wil-
liams and Hammelmann, Identification Parades, Parts I and I, 1963
Crnm. L. Rnv. 479-490, 545-555; Comment, Constitutional Ramifications
of the Lineup, 12 VILL. L. Rnv. 135 (1966); Comment, The Right to
Counsel During Police Identification Procedures, 45 TEXAs L. REv. 504
(1967).
43 Thus, a police-inspired witness could possibly have been a co-con-
spirator or someone who could have an alterior motive for identifying
any particular suspect.
44 Wall, supra note 39, at 63, also a witness identified a suspect the second
time a lineup was conducted, after the lighting had been changed in
People v. Oparka, 85 Ill. App. 2d 33, 228 N.E.2d 291 (1967).
45 One commentator urges that witnesses be required to duly attest any
description of the alleged criminal before any identification be per-
missable. Marshall, Evidence, Psychology and the Trial: Some Chal-
lenges to Law, 63 COL. L. RFv. 197, 229 (1963); see also Wall, supra
note 39, at 97; Williams, Identification Parades, 1955 C=nw. L. REv. 525,
552; and State v. Chaney, 425 P.2d 1010 (1967).
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After determining what the original description was, the attor-
ney should next determine as best he can, if the witness has been
shown a photograph of his client and if so he should note if it were
a single photograph or one of the many.4 6
Upon this determination he should then attempt to ascertain
if his client had at any time confronted the witness since he had
been taken into custody, and if this has happened he should deter-
mine in what factual situation this confrontation occurred.47
He should note if there is more than one witness attempting
to identify a suspect and, if so, whether they are kept separate
from each other or are allowed to view the lineup together. He
should also note if they communicate in any way and who, if anyone,
they picked out of the lineup.48
The attorney should then observe the lineup and note: (1) the
number of participants; 9 (2) the attire of the participants; 0 (3)
their similarity (e.g., height, race, weight, age, etc.) or dissimilar-
ity;51 (4) prospective positions in the line; and (5) any comments
46 See Simmons v. United States, 88 S.Ct. 967 (1968); People v. Evans,
39 Cal. 2d 242, 246 P.2d 636 (1952). All of the authorities known to
this writer condemn the showing of a single picture of the suspect
to the witness prior to the holding of an identification procedure. The
trouble is that in such a situation, when a witness identifies a suspect
in a lineup one doesn't know whether she is identifying the picture
she was shown or the alleged wrongdoer.
47 Any such confrontation is condemned by the authorities. See Wall,
supra note 39, at 30; Williams, Identification Parades, 1955 CnnvR. L.
REV. 525, 529; Napley, Problems of Effecting the Presentation of the
Case for a Defendant, 66 COL. L. REv. 94, 99 (1966). Wade was con-
fronted by witnesses in the hall prior to being brought into the lineup.
Counsel could have prevented this by making sure that the halls were
cleared and, if not, cleared them himself if he were present.
48 "The lineup in Gilbert, ... , was conducted in an auditorium in which
some one hundred witnesses to several alleged state and federal rob-
beries charged to Gilbert made wholesale identifications of Gilbert
as the robber in each other's presence, a procedure said to run counter
to the most elementary precepts of the psychology of suggestion."
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 234 (1967) (citations omitted).
49 As mentioned before, the fewer members in the lineup, the more it
resembles a show-up.
560 The members of the line should be similarly attired. See Murray, The
Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad, 66 UTAH L. REV. 610, 628 (1966).
51 Attempts should be made to have a line which is very similar in age,
looks, etc. However, this is often difficult to accomplish. The attorney
should note how each person does or does not resemble his client so
that he may use this information on cross-examination. The extent of
potential for prejudice in this situation is directly proportional to the
extent that the members of the line are dissimilar. Thus six white men
in a line with one Negro could be prejudicial if a Negro was known
to have committed the crime.
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which they are asked to make. He should also determine the names
and addresses of all the presiding police officers and especially the
participants in the lineup.52
He should finally ask the witness who identifies the suspect to
sign an affidavit stating something to the effect that any identifica-
tion was completely voluntary and was not influenced by any police
suggestion as to any particular suspect.5 3 The witness should then
verify, by position in line, which member of the line he or she
identified.
The next issue immediately presenting itself is what function
can counsel perform other than witnessing the pretrial identifica-
tion? The majority opinion in Wade avoids this potentially volatile
problem, yet Justice White in his dissent voices his fear of what
might be a result of the majority opinion's position:
Counsel's interest is in not having his client placed at the scene of
the crime, regardless of his whereabouts. Some counsel may advise
their clients to refuse to make any movements or to speak any
words in a lineup or even to appear in one... Others will not only
observe what occurs and develop possibilities for later cross-exami-
nation but will hover over witnesses and begin their cross-examna-
tion then, menacing truthful factfinding as thoroughly as the court
fears the police now do. Certainly there is an explicit invitation
to counsel to suggest rules for the lineup and to manage and pro-
duce it as best he can.54
Of course, no one knows whether the majority's opinion will
elicit this response on the part of the bar but it is clear that the
opinion leaves this delicate issue undisturbed for the time being.
Since the decisions leave this issue unanswered, and assuming that
lawyers will function as their own ethical conscience dictates, it
then becomes important to analyze what is the scope of the clients'
rights concerning pretrial identification confrontation, and what the
attorney faces if he takes an active role in the procedure. 55
Perhaps the first problem facing the defense attorney is who
determines at what time a post-indictment identification is to be
52 This is important so that the attorney may recreate the scene of any
prejudicial pretrial confrontation in court.
53 If a witness would hesitate to sign such an affidavit, it might indicate
that perhaps the police had accidentLy exposed the witness to the
prisoner prior to the lineup. In any event, if the witness would indi-
cate reluctance to sign such an affidavit, it might cast doubt on the
fairness of the identification.
54 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 258-59 (1967).
55 By active role, it is meant the role of adversary where the attorney
is actually physically acting in the client's behalf.
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held. The police, a representative of the prosecution's office,5 6 the
defense attorney, and the witness or witnesses will likely be in
attendance. The defense attorney should consider: (1) how emo-
tionally upset is the witness, 57 (2) whether he has had an oppor-
tunity to determine the basic requisite facts leading up to the neces-
sity of the lineup, and (3) his own availability.
Perhaps the most difficult decision confronting the attorney in
terms of the present state of the law is how he should advise his
client regarding a request by the police to repeat any alleged words
used at the scene of the crime. This was a five to four decision and
there is an indication that the court could in the future interpret
any such act as violating the suspect's right against self-incrimina-
tion.58
However, as the law stands today, no event at the lineup either
voice identification, or the showing of pictures of the suspect to a
witness prior to a lineup is a violation of the fifth amendment pri-
vilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, since voice identifica-
tion at the lineup is not a violation of the fifth amendment, and at
this point is a constitutionally acceptable procedure for the police,
what would be the result of an attorney advising his client not to
speak? And if he did so advise, and the police obtained a court
order stating in effect that he must advise his client to speak, and
the attorney standing on principle refused to follow the court order,
has he then sent an invitation to the court to file a contempt of
court charge against him? Also, perhaps the state could arraign
the attorney on a suppression of evidence or obstruction of justice
charge. Finally, at any time the attorney ceases to be only a witness
and begins assuming the roles of pretrial arbitrator, negotiator,
advisor and friend-what ethical problems, if any does he confront?
56 The presence of a representative of the prosecution is optional as the
police officers fulfill this function. But certainly if he were present
both the attorney for the defense and the attorney for the prosecution
would be in a good position to conduct a fair lineup as it is both the
prosecution's and the defense's sworn duty to insure that justice is done.
For an encouraging example of such cooperation see Appendix One.
57 A witness in a highly emotional state would seem to be less reliable
than one who is calm and relaxed.
5s The five justices who were of the opinion that compelling a suspect
to speak for voice identification is not a violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment were: J. White, J. Brennan, J. Stewart, J. Harlan and J. Clark.
Those who felt such compulsion was a violation were: J. Black, J.
Fortas, J. Douglas, and J. Warren. Justice Clark who voted with the
majority has since left the court to be replaced by Justice Marshall
who could be the swing vote in the future. See also Palmer v. Peyton,
359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1967).
COMMENTS
Canon 31 places the ultimate responsibility (and perhaps liabil-
ity) on the attorney: "The responsibility for advising as to question-
able transactions, for bringing questionable suits, for urging ques-
tionable defenses, is the lawyer's responsibility.' ' 9 The issue here
is whether the use of obstructionist tactics is in fact the urging of
questionable defenses. It is the opinion of this writer that any
defense urged in this area, if urged in complete honesty and good
faith, is not a violation of Canon 31. Since the court has via Wade,
Gilbert and Stovall opened this area to reform of its own accord, it
can only expect that attorneys will act in a manner which best pro-
tects their clients' rights. In fact, Justice Black in his dissent said:
Besides counsel's presence at the lineup being necesary to protect
the defendant's specific constitutional rights to confrontation and
the assistance of counsel at the trial itself, the assistance of coun-
sel at the lineup is also necessary to protect the defendant's in-cus-
tody assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination, (citation
omitted), for contrary to the court I believe that counsel may
advise the defendant not to participate in the lineup or to partici-
pate only under certain conditions.60
Thus, it does not seem that advising a client not to submit to unfair
identification methods would be urging a questionable defense.
However, since eight members of the court agree that a lineup per se
is not self-incrimination an attorney should refrain from advising
a client to not participate unless absolutely positive that to not so
advise in a particular situation would do his client irreparable harm.
The attorney must, commensurate with his personal and the
the profession's Code of Ethics, make the final decision as to whether
to be only a witness or an adversary in each situation. He cannot
remove himself from the problem by removing himself from the
case without coming in conflict with Canon 4.61
An attorney who feels that he should advise his client through-
out the police station identification to prevent any unfairness finds
support in Canon 5:
It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person
accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt
of the accused; otherwise innocent persons, victims only of suspi-
cious circumstances, might be denied proper defense. Having
undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound, by all fair and hon-
59 ABA CANOxNs OF PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs No. 31.
60 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 246 (1967) (emphasis added).
61 "A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to
ask to be excused for any trivial reason, and should always exert his
best efforts in his behalf." ABA CAxoNS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No.
4.
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orable means to present every defense that the law of the land
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or
liberty, but by due proces of law .... 62
Canon 39 indicates that in any event counsel may actively elicit
any information concerning the identification from the identifying
witness, if he does so in good faith . 3
Perhaps, the attorney acting as an adversary and as a witness
in good faith and for good cause, may be the only safeguard against
irreparable harm to his client. However, with cooperation between
the prosecution and the defense keeping the welfare of both the
system and the client in mind, this issue should only be academic.
An example of such cooperation is set out in the Appendix.
III. WHERE ARE WE GOING?
As before mentioned the court does a thorough job of analyzing
the pretrial identification procedures and of recognizing the poten-
tial for prejudicial error at this critical stage of the proceedings
against an accused, however, the Court only in a cursory manner
involves itself with the confusion which results when rule-books
must be rewritten.
Certainly the Court points to the possibility of legislative reform
as a solution in making the comment that:
Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police depart-
ments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional sugges-
tion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaningful con-
frontation at trial may also remove the basis for regarding the stage
as 'critical', but neither Congress nor the federal authorities have
seen fit to provide a solution.64
The Court indicated that perhaps a special counsel could serve
as a substitute counsel to observe the lineup to insure that the
identification proceedings were conducted fairly.6 5 However, query
whether a substitute counsel would continue to protect his tern-
62 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSiONAL ETmcs No. 5. (emphasis added)
63 "A lawyer may properly interview any witness or prospective witness
for the opposing side in any civil or criminal action without the con-
sent of opposing counsel or party. In doing so, however, he should
scrupulously avoid any suggestion calculated to induce the witness to
suppress or deviate from the truth, or in any degree to affect his free
and untrammeled conduct when appearing at the trial or on the wit-
ness stand." ABA CANoNs OF PROFESSIONAL Enmics No. 39.
64 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967).
65 "Moreover, we leave open the question whether the presence of sub-
stitute counsel might not suffice where notification and presence of
the suspect's own counsel would result in prejudicial delay." 388 U.S.
218,237 (1967).
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porary clients' rights with the same vigor as permanent counsel.
Also, how does this suggestion square with the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics6 and isn't there certainly a humane consideration
involved?6 7 Finally, how likely is it that a substitute counsel will
become a bureaucrat who cooperates to a large extent with the
police and whose ultimate employer is the state?
At a cursory glance, revision of police regulations seems to be
tenable enough, but on closer inspection some acute if not insur-
mountable problems become apparent. If it would be possible
that (1) all the police departments were to so change their regu-
lations in some approved manner which would insure that to a
great degree suggestiveness would be curtailed, and, (2) the Su-
preme Court could be assured that this had in fact been done, then
perhaps, as the argument goes, the stage would no longer be critical.
But how realistic is this approach?
In the first place any such course would take several years (at
the minimum) for the states to adopt. And secondly, if the stage
no longer becomes critical and counsel stays at home completely
trustful of the actions of police does not the very secrecy argument
that the court presented so aptly in its opinion come back into
existence, and aren't we then right back where we started, with no
effective remedy against a police breach of their rule-book? For if
the police break the rules it becomes apparent that the rules of the
game are such that it usually is never found out. It is common
knowledge that policemen have a strong sympathy and affinity
for fellow policemen, thus there may be witnesses to any police
breach of the rules but these witnesses are only fellow officers, doing
a job together, and they certainly will have no desire to aid the
other side.68 Therefore, it seems that counsel's presence at such
"critical" stages of the pretrial confrontations will be necessary
for some time.
The court quoted with approval one commentator's ideal sta-
tute.6 9 Certainly, a comprehensive statute would be a step in the
right direction, for such a statute would then allow an attorney
to specifically base his comments to the police concerning any viola-
66 "The right of an attorney or counsel to withdraw from employment,
once assumed, arises only from good cause. Even the desire or consent
of the client is not always sufficient . " ABA CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL EmTcs No. 44.
67 E.g., what about the suspect who gets shuffled from one counsel to
another? Does he not lose some confidence in the process?
68 See Justice Black's dissent in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
where he points out the untenability of recourse to the police for a
wrong incurred.69 United States v. Wade, 288 U.S. 218, 236 n. 26 (1967).
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tion of specific statutory guarantees and the suspect would then,
if adequately represented by competent counsel, be insured of an
identification as fair as is practical.
Perhaps a better solution more in line with what actually
happens is available. Since the Wade, Gilbert and Stovall decisions
give attorneys a new weapon in their defense arsenal, many attor-
neys have, (not surprisingly) used these cases to support an appel-
late attack on the constitutionality and fairness of the clients' con-
victions.70 These attacks have not seemed to concern the appellate
courts as they have first applied the non-retroactivity holding of
Stovall and then they have examined the confrontations, found them
not to unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mis-
taken identification that appelant was denied due process of law"7 1
which is determined by "the totality of the circumstances surround-
ing it."72 This way of handling the situation is fine for the present,
while non-retroactivity can be used as an easy out, but what about
the turmoil which may result when the floodgates are opened on the
courts and most identifications occurring after June 12, 1967, are
challenged?
A look at People v. Smiley73 is in order. Counsel made a motion
for a pretrial hearing to determine whether the police lineup or
show-up was "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification,"74 thus depriving defendant of due process
of law. The District Attorney's office opposed the motion on the
following grounds: (1) the Stovall decision does not make mandate
70 See United States v. Tomaiolo, 378 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967); United
States v. Reed, 376 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1967); State v. Chaney, -Cal.
2d-, 428 P.2d 1004,- Cal. Rptr.- (1967); People v. Crosslin, -Cal.
2d-, -P.2d-, 60 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1967); People v. Boone, -Cal. 2d
-,-P.2d-, 60 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1967); People v. Cook, -Cal. 2d -,-
P.2d -, 60 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1967); People v. Diaz, -Cal. 2d -, 427 P.2d
505, 58 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1967); State v. Trotter, 4 Conn. Cir. 185, 230
A.2d 618 (1967); People v. Conway, -Ill. App. 2d -, 228 N.E.2d 548
(1967); People v. Williams 84 Ill. App. 2d 1, 228 N.E.2d 501 (1967);
People v. Oparka, -Ill. App. 2d -, 228 N.E.2d 291 (1967); People v.
McIntosh, 82 Ill. App. 2d 90, 227 N.E.2d 76 (1967); State v. Nelson 223
Ga. 497, 156 S.E.2d 341 (1967); Nadalski v. State, 1 Md. App. 304, 229
A.2d 598 (1967); Dorlch v. State, 1 Md. App. 2d 173, 229 A2d 148(1967); State v. Jones, - Minn. -, 152 N.W.2d 67 (1967); State v.
Garrity, - Minn. -, 151 N.W.2d 773 (1967); State v. Romero, 95 N.J.
Super. 482, 231, A.2d 830 (1967); State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 231 A.2d
565 (1967); State v. Matlock, 49 N.J. 491, 231 A.2d 369 (1967); People
v. Iilburn, 19 N.Y.2d 910, 227 N.E.2d 893, 281 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1967).
71 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
72 Id. at 302.
73 54 Misc. 2d 826, 284 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
74 Id at 826, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
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a hearing; (2) the unconstitutionality can only be attacked after con-
viction; (3) that if a hearing be granted it only may be granted after
the defendant exhausted his cross-examination. In support of the
third ground the District Attorney argued that it would be an undue
burden on a victim to have to testify twice.
Justice Martinis ordered the hearing reasoning that:
There is no legislative provision or judicial precedent for granting
the type of hearing here requested,... (citation omitted) the courts
must improvise as was done in 'search and seizure' and 'involuntary
confessions' so that hearings would be held to conform with the
requirements thereof. The ruling in Stovall implicitly appears to
require that a hearing be held upon a proper showing.j 5
Finally Justice Martinis ended his opinion by advising:
However, should this case reach appellate review or for future
guidance to trial justices on this issue, it is humbly suggested, from
personal experience and observation in the instant procedure, that
upon proper cause being shown by the defendant, a pre-trial
(italics in original) hearing be conducted, inasmuch as the hearing
could become long and protracted, while the trial is in suspension,
with the jurors becoming inconvenienced, worn and impatient
awaiting the resumption of the trial and with further considera-
tion of the added expense to the state.76
Certainly Justice Martinis is to be commended for instituting effec-
tive reform at the trial level where defendant will not have to
appeal to be granted his full right to a fair trial. However, perhaps
the best solution to this problem is to proceed one step further
then the able trial judge did.
It is the opinion of this writer that the most tenable solution
to this problem on both a nationwide and a state level is the removal
of the pretrial identification stage from the police department and
have any pretrial identification conducted under the supervision and
scrutiny of a neutral magistrate. It seems that such a solution
would be both practical and would fulfill constitutional require-
ments. A reading of several of the recent cases concerning appellate
decisions decided after June 12, 1967, shows that often lineups are
-conducted by the police in a courthouse, a fact which would indicate
that a magistrate would be easily accessible. Also, such judicial
presence would greatly minimize any attacks on the fairness of
identification since it would be the magistrates sworn duty to con-
duct a fair identification.
75 Id. at 828, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
76 Id. at 830, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
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A statute77 is necessary which would set out certain procedures
which would limit, to as practical a degree as possible, any sug-
gestiveness; and when the identification is finished the magistrate
would file an affidavit, duly certified by two or more impartial wit-
nesses that the identication process was conducted in accordance
with statutory requirements of fairness and objectivity. Concern-
ing the problem of the police inducing accidental prejudicial identi-
fication show-ups, if any evidence indicated that a witness had con-
fronted the suspect prior to the judicial courthouse identification
then a hearing would have to be held to determine any prejudice
that might have resulted.
As a final safeguard, the identifying witness would also file
a sworn written affidavit that he had not confronted the suspect
which he identified prior to the trial. The steps taken in the above
manner will best balance the interest of the state and the consti-
tutional rights of the suspect. First, the suspect would be insured
of a fair identification that is not tainted by the pretrial activity
of the police. It would also eliminate the necessity of mandatory
presence of counsel thus easing the financial burden of the state.
It would also cut down on expense in that it would be much cheaper
to have a magistrate preside over a judicial identification than to
later have to interrupt the trial to conduct a hearing on what hap-
pened in the police station several months prior to the trial. By
the same token the trial judge would evaluate the testimony of
the police and defense attorney and because of their prospective
adversary roles it would be a good guess that such testimony would
be conflicting. Thus, with the situation as it is now, the judge
must attempt to use hindsight to determine what happened. How-
ever, if the aforesaid remedy would be applied such a hearing
would be rare, in fact, almost non-existent absent a breach of the
statute or rule. Adoption of such a procedure would also virtually
eliminate appeals based on this issue which in the case of indigents,
where the state now pays for both the prosecution and the defense,
may become quite expensive. Along with all of the preceding, the
adoption of such a procedure would extract the attorney from the
delicate position which the Wade, Gilbert and Stovall holdings now
leave him in, namely a situation where he might have to play an
obstructing role in the police station to insure his client his right
to a fair trial.
John W. Atwood '69
77 This writer recommends a statute based upon criteria similar to that
set out in the Appendix.
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APPENDIX*
PROCEDURE FOR LINEup IDENTIFICATIONS
The Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218
(1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967), summarized in 4
Defender Newsletter 38-41 (July 1967), announce new constitutional stand-
ards for lineups. The Court recognized the legitimacy of the lineup and
stated that the lineup did not violate the privilege against sef-incrimina-
tion- We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit his
person for observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves no
compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial significance."
388 U. S. 218, 222. Although both cases involved post-indictment lineups
conducted in the absence of counsel, new procedures were necessary to as-
sure that this critical pre-trial confrontation between the accused and the
-witnesses against him was conducted in a fair manner. The presence of
counsel is necessary to protect the accused's interest, and now counsel for
the accused is required unless intelligently and understandingly waived.
In Clark County (Las Vegas), Nevada, the district attorney and the
public defender jointly adopted a step-by-step procedure which strives to
achieve a balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of
society. That agreement and check-list are set out below.
Joint Memorandum
FROM: Office of the District Attorney, Clark County, Nevada, and
Office of the Public Defender, Clark County, Nevada
TO: All Law Enforcement Agencies, Clark County, Nevada
SUBJECT: Line-up Identification Procedures
The recent decisions of United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California
have necessitated a reappraisal of the procedures employed in witness' line-
up identification of suspects accused of the commission of a crime.
A study of the procedures used and pertinent case law has been made
by the District Attorney and the Public Defender of Clark County, Nevada.
This has resulted in the directions for the conduct of line-up identification
in the manner set out in the attachments. These procedures will afford
suspects accused of crime the Constitutional safeguards provided in the
Wade and Gilbert cases and at the same time will protect society from un-
necessary appeals or loss of cases resulting from improper line-up identifi-
cation procedures.
The office of the above District Attorney and the Public Defender are
of the opinion that the institution of these procedures are in the interests of
justice for the protection of the Constitutional rights of those accused of
crime and to the substantial benefit of the public as a whole.
s/Richard H. Bryan s/George E. Franklin
Richard H. Bryan George E. Franklin, Jr.
Public Defender District Attorney
* The material appended here was taken from American Bar Center,
Defender Newsletter 55-57 (Sept. 1967).
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CHECK LIST FOR Linx-up IDENTIFICATION
1. No line-up identification should be held without discussing the legal
advisability of such line-up with the office of the District Attorney.
2. No line-up should be held without a member of the District At-
torney's office being present.
3. No line-up should be held without a member of the Public Defend-
er's office* being present.
4. Insofar as possible, all persons in line-up should be of the same
general age, racial and physical characteristics (including dress).
5. Should any body movement, gesture, or verbal statement be neces-
sary, this should also be done uniformly and any such movement, gesture,
statement be done one time only by each person participating in the line-up
and repeated only at the express request of the person attempting to make
identification.
6. The customary line-up photograph should be taken, developed as
soon as possible and a copy of such photograph made available immediately
to the Public Defender's office.*
7. If more than one person is called to view a line-up, the persons
should not be allowed, before the completion of all witnesses' attempted
identification, to discuss among themselves any facet of their view of the
line-up or the result of their conclusions regarding the same.
8. Ali witnesses who are to view the line-up should be prevented from
seeing the suspect in custody and in particular in handcuffs, or in any man-
ner that would indicate to the witness the identity of the suspect in question.
9. All efforts should be made to prevent a witness from viewing any
photographs of the suspect prior to giving the line-up.
10. All conversation between the police officer and prospective wit-
nesses should be restricted to only indispensible direction. In all cases noth-
ing should be said to the witness to suggest suspect is standing in the par-
ticular line-up.
11. Should there be any more than one witness, only one witness at a
time should be present in the room where the line-up is conducted.
12. There should be a minimum of persons present in the room where
the line-up is conducted, and a suggested group would be the law enforce-
ment officer conducting the line-up, a representative of the District At-
torney's office, a representative of the Public Defender's* office and an
investigator of that office if requested by the Public Defender.
13. The line-up report prepared by the law enforcement agency con-
ducting the line-up should be prepared in sufficient number of copies to
make a copy available, at the line-up, to the Public Defender.*
14. Each witness, as he appears in the room where the line-up is
conducted, should be handed a form for use in the identification. Explana-
tion for the use of the form is self-explanatory and a sample copy is at-
tached hereto. This form should be signed by the witness, by a representa-
tive of the Public Defender's office*, and by the law enforcement officer
conducting the line-up.
15. A copy of this Identification Form should be given to the Public
Defender's office* at the completion of the viewing of the line-up by each
individual witness.
* This would apply to any privately retained attorney, should he be there
in lieu of the Public Defender.
COAIIMENTS
Witness' Line-up Identification Form
To Witness:
The positions of the persons in the line-up will be numbered left to
right, beginning with one(l) on your left.
1. If you have previously seen one or more of the persons in the line-
up, place an I'" in the appropriate square corresponding to the number
of the person in the line-up.
2. Then, sign your name and fill in the date and time.
3. When completed, hand this sheet to the officer.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7[ l EI 0 EI lI []
Signature of Witness
Signature of Law Enforcement Officer Date and Time
Signature of Public Defender or
Attorney for Suspect
